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Abstract
The 2010 Summer Workshop on Money, Banking, Payments and Finance
met at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago this summer, for the second
year. The following document summarizes and ties together the papers
presented.
1 Introduction
The annual Summer Workshop on Money, Banking, Payments and Finance met
again in August 2010. The theme once again was on institutions that facili-
tate the exchange process, including money, credit, banks, asset markets, and
related topics. Most of the work uses the branch of economic theory recently
dubbed New Monetarist Economics in surveys by Stephen Williamson and Ran-
dall Wright (2010a, 2010b), and extensively described in the book by Ed Nosal
and Guillaume Rocheteau (2011). The goal in this framework is to take micro-
foundations of the exchange process seriously, as opposed to resorting to ad hoc
shortcuts (such as imposing cash-in-advance constraints or inserting money into
utility functions), or simply ignoring institutions meant to facilitate exchange
(as in most New Keynesian models). This ￿eld of research is extremely active
and many papers have been making progress in terms of our understanding of
basic theory, our development of applications, including policy analysis, and our
understanding of the evidence.
This year 32 papers were presented. These can be broadly grouped into six
broad topics: liquidity, which is the ability to quickly buy or sell assets (or other
objects) with a short delay and at a low cost; ￿nancial intermediation, with a fo-
cus on the roles of banks; international economics, which examines issues related
to money, capital, liquidity and exchange rate determination in an international
1context; history, which tries to understand interesting economic episodes in the
past through the lens of modern theory; information, which involves model-
ing information asymmetries that characterize, for example, over-the-counter
markets and ￿nancial markets, in general; and theory, which involves work on
relatively deep issues related to money, banking, payments or ￿nance. Here we
summarize and to some extent try to consolidate the individual contributions.
2 Liquidity
The last two U.S. recessions were preceded by rapid increases, followed by abrupt
collapses, in some asset prices. These events have suggested to many that asset
prices can rise above levels justi￿ed by fundamentals, and that price corrections
can trigger or amplify economic ￿ uctuations, with important consequences for
the macroeconomy. When and how can economic models generate this type of
asset price behavior as an equilibrium outcome? This issue is nontrivial since
generating such asset price dynamics is not easy in standard models. In ￿Liq-
uidity and Asset Price Dynamics,￿Guillaume Rocheteau and Randall Wright
study an economy with an essential role for liquid assets. The model can gener-
ate multiple stationary equilibria, across which asset prices, participation, stock
market capitalization, output and welfare are positively related. Even when
fundamentals are deterministic and time invariant, there can be a variety of
non-stationary equilibria. This includes equilibria with price trajectories that
resemble bubbles growing and bursting, as well as periodic, chaotic, and sto-
chastic (sunspot) equilibria with recurrent market crashes. The issue of optimal
liquidity provision is also examined. This paper extends the class of models we
can use to help understand dynamic asset markets and the role of liquidity.
During ￿nancial crises, many asset prices plummet, destroying their liquidity
provision function at the worst time. These ￿re sales appear to be at the core
of the ampli￿cation mechanism and credit crunch observed in some crises. How
can this occur in deep ￿nancial markets, such as those in the U.S. where a
large number of potential buyers should have the resources to arbitrage ￿re
sales? In ￿Fire Sales in a Model of Complexity,￿Ricardo Caballero and Alp
Simsek propose a model in which the answer builds on the idea that complexity
becomes a central concern during crises. The basic structure of their model
is that of a ￿nancial network that is susceptible to contagion and cascades.
During normal times, banks only need to understand the ￿nancial health of
their trading partners, which they can learn at low cost. In contrast, when
a signi￿cant problem arises in a part of the network, and the possibility of
cascades arises, it is not enough to be informed about these partners. It is also
important to learn about the health of their trading partners. As conditions
deteriorate, banks must learn about the health of the trading partners of the
trading partners of their trading partners, and so on. Eventually, the problem
becomes too complex to fully ￿gure out, which means banks face signi￿cant
uncertainty. This rise in uncertainty makes relatively healthy banks, and hence
potential asset buyers, reluctant to buy. This is help in understanding how
2liquidity in the market can quickly vanish.
A sharp decline in the volume of new issuances in the U.S. secondary loan
market has resulted in a variety proposals intended to restore the ￿normal￿func-
tioning of this market. In ￿Adverse Selection, Reputation and Sudden Collapses
in Secondary Loan Markets,￿V.V. Chari, Ali Shourideh, and Ariel Zetlin-Jones
analyze why new issuances might abruptly collapse. The main economic func-
tion of the secondary loan market is to allocate originated loans to individuals
and institutions that have a comparative advantage in holding or managing
these loans. This function can be disrupted by informational frictions. In par-
ticular, an adverse selection problem arises since loan originators di⁄er in their
ability to originate high-quality loans, and are better informed about this ability
than potential purchasers. Reputational considerations can either ameliorate or
intensify this problem. The model has fragile outcomes in which sudden col-
lapses in the volume of new issuances are associated with increased ine¢ ciency.
Reductions in collateral values worsen the adverse selection problem and induce
some potential sellers to hold on to their loans. Reputational incentives induce
a large fraction of potential sellers to hold on to their loans rather than sell them
in the secondary market. As a result, a small reduction in collateral value can
cause a large number of originators to hold their loans, leading to a collapse in
new issuances. The authors discuss a variety of interest rate and loan purchase
policies.
In a similar vein, the crisis has forced governments or central banks to heav-
ily intervene in ￿nancial markets that were impaired by risk and uncertainty. In
￿Market Freeze and Recovery: Trading Dynamics under Optimal Intervention
by a Market-Maker-of-Last-Resort,￿Jonathan Chiu and Thor Koeppl study how
a ￿nancial market where trading has ceased reacts to intervention by a large
player. They analyze the optimal design of intervention as a crisis is unfolding.
In the context of a search model with adverse selection, they demonstrate that
trading of a ￿nancial asset can cease when its average quality drops su¢ ciently,
or when trading frictions increase su¢ ciently. A large player like a central bank
can re-establish trading if he removes a large quantity of bad assets. This in-
volves assuming losses. They show that such a player does not have to intervene
immediately: an announcement today of future intervention can cause markets
to rebound. This announcement e⁄ect gives rise to a trade-o⁄ between the size
and timing of interventions. The optimal policy balances the cost of transfers
against the cost of illiquidity. If the former are small, it is optimal to ensure that
markets function continuously. This is achieved by intervening immediately, but
at a minimum scale. When the costs of transfers increase, it is better to delay
intervention and increase its size. Furthermore, if the central bank is required to
maintain continuously functioning markets, they show that the optimal policy
is to intervene immediately after the shock, but at the minimum scale that is
required to resurrect the market. This is in stark contrast to the literature that
analyzes optimal market making in the face of pure liquidity shocks.
If ￿nancial market participants lack commitment, capital can be valued for
its ability to facilitate intertemporal trade. For example, capital is frequently
used as collateral in support of debt. Most of the time, private instruments work
3tolerably well in facilitating payments. There are recurring episodes, however,
when the system is disrupted by a decline in the value of capital. In ￿Money
and Capital in a News Economy,￿David Andolfatto and Fernando Martin inter-
pret such episodes as the consequence of ￿bad news￿that lowers the conditional
forecast of future capital returns. Government policy designed to subsidize cap-
ital in depressed conditions has an ambiguous impact on welfare. On the one
hand, such a policy eases credit conditions. On the other hand, it promotes
overaccumulation of capital goods that are used for collateral. They also in-
vestigate the desirability of other interventions in the payments system. The
model suggests the desirability of government money or debt for use in pay-
ments. While this conclusion is not new, the rationale o⁄ered is novel. In a
stochastic economy with limited commitment, even risk-neutral traders have a
preference for assets that exhibit ￿value preservation￿over short horizons. One
bene￿t of government money or debt is that its value is not tied directly to any
underlying capital object, so it may be less sensitive to ￿news.￿This suggests
that government debt is valued in the payments system because it may retain
its value in depressed conditions.
During the recent ￿nancial crisis, policy makers introduced a number of
new tools to address the apparent lack of liquidity in ￿nancial markets. In
￿Optimal Liquidity Policy,￿Jennifer Huang and Jiang Wang construct a simple
theoretical framework to examine issues associated with policy intervention. In
their environment liquidity provision is ine¢ cient in the market equilibrium,
in both an ex ante and ex post sense. The ine¢ ciency arises because agents
are unable to pro￿tably capture the entire externality associated with liquidity
provision. They demonstrate that policy interventions that resemble those that
we saw during the recent crisis often have limited or undesirable e⁄ects. They
propose a constrained optimal liquidity policy.
3 Financial Intermediation
How are publicly- and privately-provided liquidity important for exchange in
￿nancial markets? How does monetary policy matter for in￿ ation and real al-
locations, through its e⁄ects on exchange and intermediation? In ￿Liquidity,
Financial Intermediation, and Monetary Policy,￿Stephen Williamson addresses
these questions in a model that integrates elements of received banking and
monetary theory. In contrast to standard approaches, open market operations
need not be neutral, even in the long run. This is because a one-time open
market purchase of nominal government debt reduces the supply of public liq-
uidity backing intermediary claims used in ￿nancial markets. The real interest
rate falls, re￿ ecting asset scarcity, and this increases intermediary lending and
output. The model shows how ￿scal policy (active or passive) matters, and illus-
trates how the costs of operating a currency system matter for the determination
of an optimal in￿ ation rate. Some examples show the e⁄ects of a ￿nancial crisis
on the economy, and how policy should respond. Monetary policy works quite
di⁄erently when banks are holding excess reserves. In that case, the interest
4rate on reserves determines all other interest rates, and open market operations
are irrelevant. A liquidity trap can occur for any in￿ ation rate, given the ap-
propriate monetary policy, not just at the Friedman rule. This is a ￿ne example
of getting new insights about critical policy issues by using modern monetary
theory.
In related work, ￿Liquidity, Asset Prices, and Credit Constraints,￿by Ying-
Syuan Li and Yiting Li, the implications are examined for asset prices and
borrowing in an economy with limited commitment, enforcement and record
keeping. Banks provide a socially bene￿cial role by channelling funds from
people with idle liquidity to those with needs to ￿nance consumption. Because
banks o⁄er loan contracts that allows agents to borrow only as much as they have
an incentive to repay, credit constraints endogenously emerge. The relationship
between asset prices, aggregate liquidity and allocations are characterized. An
asset will command a liquidity premium when credit constraints bind, and the
premium is higher when credit rationing is more severe. Monetary policies can
in￿ uence macroeconomic outcomes through the credit channel, and the precise
e⁄ects depend on the technology to deter default. If exclusion from future
credit is feasible, aggregate liquidity and output may rise with in￿ ation, because
in￿ ation raises the cost of losing the access to future credit. Even though the
asset price is reduced by in￿ ation, liquidity may be increased because of higher
loan-to-value ratios. The asset price is reduced by in￿ ation since money and real
assets, which are used as collateral, are complements. This is in contrast to most
of the literature, in which money and other assets are substitutes. This paper
thus greatly enhances our understanding of the relationship between money and
asset prices.
Continuing on the theme of intermediation, most theories of banking crises
focus on the case where contracts are written in real terms, so ￿liquidity￿means
the availability of a physical good that can be used for consumption or invest-
ment. There is, therefore, a real opportunity cost to providing liquidity to
the ￿nancial system. In practice, however, ￿nancial contracts are almost al-
ways written in nominal terms. The possibility of nominal contracts potentially
makes a signi￿cant di⁄erence because it means that the central bank can cost-
lessly create money to deal with a crisis. In ￿Money, Financial Stability and
E¢ ciency,￿ Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti and Douglas Gale use a standard
banking model but with nominal rather than real contracts. They show that
the combination of nominal contracts and a central bank that accommodates
commercial banks￿demand for liquidity leads to e¢ ciency. This implies there
are no ￿nancial crises even when liquidity demands are high or asset returns
are low. The e¢ ciency result holds with aggregate and idiosyncratic liquidity
shocks, as well as aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty about asset returns.
Although the assumption of nominal contracting perhaps requires some more
justi￿cation, it is important to know the implications.
In ￿Liquidity Transformation and Bank Capital Requirements,￿Hajime To-
mura presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of banking, where liquidity
transformation and bank capital requirements arise endogenously. New real as-
sets are produced from goods, and the fraction of agents that can produce them
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needed to produce new assets. Adverse selection in the secondary market means
potential producers of new assets are discouraged from selling high-quality as-
sets. As a result, they purchase and invest less. The market￿ s undervaluation
or illiquidity of assets leads to a demand for liquid assets. Banks can meet
this demand since they can issue liabilities backed by assets from the secondary
market. Bank liabilities are priced fairly since the idiosyncratic qualities of real
assets held by a bank average out. The existence of these liabilities increases
liquidity. However, the secondary market price for real assets is reduced. The
model shows that if the business cycle is driven by productivity shocks, then
￿ uctuations in the capital-asset ratio of banks are pro-cyclical, but they are
counter-cyclical if a rise in heterogeneity of asset quality increases the illiquidity
of real assets in the competitive secondary market for real assets. This work
is pointing us in the right direction in terms of understanding secondary asset
markets.
4 International
Several papers applied modern monetary theory to study international eco-
nomic issues. For example, in response to a global dollar shortage in the recent
crisis, the Fed injected dollar liquidity into the international ￿nancial system.
Empirical studies of the success of these e⁄orts have yielded mixed results be-
cause it is di¢ cult to disentangle the e⁄ects of policy from those of news about
fundamentals. In ￿Dollar Illiquidity and Central Bank Facilities During the
U.S. Sub-Prime Crisis,￿ Andrew Rose and Mark Spiegel develop a model of
dollar illiquidity. In their model, assets are valued for both their returns and
liquidity services. When the liquidity of an asset declines (say, toxic Ameri-
can mortgage-backed securities), the model predicts that the dollar appreciates
since the demand for close substitutes increases through a ￿￿ ight to liquidity.￿
The theory suggests that nations with more exposure to the US are likely to
be more sensitive to global capital injections, such as the term auction facilities
conducted by the ECB and others. Although the preliminary evidence is mixed,
some auctions appear to yield results in line with their theory.
Another issues in international economics is this. Even though low in￿ a-
tion rate international currencies are increasingly available in most economies,
domestic currencies remain the dominant means of payment in most countries.
This observation seems to contradict the literature on currency competition,
which predicts that in absence of transaction costs agents will use the less in￿ a-
tionary currency. In ￿In￿ ation, Debt Enforcement and Currency Competition,￿
Mariana Rojas Breu constructs a framework in which higher in￿ ation currencies
are used despite the availability of a lower in￿ ationary currency and the absence
of transactions costs. The model is a standard monetary economy with banks,
where a key assumption is that debt enforcement is not perfect. Under certain
conditions, the in￿ ation rate of a currency in which debts are denominated may
function as a commitment device. A higher in￿ ationary currency can be used in
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will be higher if the currency in which they borrow is more in￿ ationary. That is,
there will be a smaller bene￿t associated with defaulting on debt that is written
on the more in￿ ationary currency. Lending agents anticipate that borrowers
are able to better commit to repaying their loans the more in￿ ationary is the
currency. As a result, banks are willing to hold a more in￿ ationary currency.
This is a novel spin on a topical issue.
A related issue is this. Over the past decade, OECD countries have held
nearly three quarters of their wealth in domestic assets. This is at odds with
standard frictionless models that predict risk averse agents will insure away
country-speci￿c risks by holding a portfolio of international assets. A large
literature has tackled this ￿home bias￿puzzle by examining frictions that limit
the ability of agents to diversify internationally. In ￿Asset Liquidity and Equity
Home Bias,￿Thanasis Geromichalos and Ina Simonovska attempt to rationalize
this puzzle through a mechanism that links home bias to liquidity. The concept
of asset liquidity arises when assets can serve a duel role: they are claims to
future consumption and means of payments. If there are better opportunities
to trade in domestic than foreign decentralized markets, agents will have a
greater demand for home assets. Since agents hold more domestic assets, they
bring more of these assets to domestic markets and exchange them for larger
quantities of goods. Hence, asset home bias also generates consumption home
bias, as in the data. The authors have a promising framework for future work
in the area.
In ￿Goods Market Frictions and Real Exchange Rate Puzzles￿ Qing Liu
develops a two-country dynamic search model with fully ￿ exible price. His
approach deviates from the literature, which relies on the interaction of nominal
price rigidities and monetary shocks. His goods market is decentralized and
modeled using random bilateral matching. Search frictions in markets generate
a di⁄erential in a household￿ s valuations of two currencies, and results in a
deviation from the law of one price at both the disaggregate and aggregate
levels. Quantitative results suggest that deviations from the law of one price
contribute to the majority of the ￿ uctuations in exchange rates observed in the
data. Moreover, the model performs well quantitatively with respect to two
other stylized facts: changes in real exchange rates are highly persistent; and
there are systematic changes in the volatility of real exchange rates when there
is a switch of exchange rate regimes. This is another promising framework for
future work in international economics.
Similarly, in ￿Money, Capital and International Exchange Rate Fluctua-
tions,￿Pere Gomis-Porqueras, Timothy Kam and Junsang Lee examine whether
a ￿ exible price, two-country, search model of money can account for empirical
regularities in U.S. real and nominal exchange rate dynamics. In the data, the
real and nominal exchanges rates are more volatile than GDP, are highly per-
sistent, and are highly positively correlated. The authors use a two-country
version of the Lagos-Wright model, where capital is a productive input for sell-
ers in the decentralized market. There are two mechanisms at work that help
amplify and propagate international shocks: the monetary friction, and capital
7accumulation. The monetary friction can be controlled by introducing an ex-
ogenous probability that agents in decentralized trade may be in one two kinds
of trades, anonymous monetary trades or monitored credit trades. If the mon-
etary friction is shut down by having only credit trades, the authors show that
the model cannot account for the facts on exchange rates. However, if a small
proportion of trades are anonymous￿ so agents must use money￿ then aggre-
gate relative prices are relatively non-volatile and persistent. This contributes
to the excess volatility and persistence in the real and nominal exchange rate.
Thus, without exogenous price-stickiness, the model rationalizes the correlation
between real and nominal exchange rate.
In ￿Heterogeneity and the Welfare Cost of In￿ ation: An International Per-
spective,￿ Paola Boel quanti￿es the welfare cost of anticipated in￿ ation in a
model with equilibrium dispersion in wealth and earnings. The model is cal-
ibrated to several OECD economies, including Australia, Austria, Canada,
France, Italy, Spain and the U.S. In all economies, except Australia, a rep-
resentative agent would give up only a fraction of 1% of consumption to avoid
10% in￿ ation. Even if in￿ ation does not generate large losses in societal welfare,
she ￿nds that in all countries considered, in￿ ation has signi￿cant redistributive
e⁄ects. Moreover, such redistributive e⁄ects vary depending on the ￿nancial
assets present in the economy. If money is the only asset, then in￿ ation hurts
the wealthier agents, while those poorer bene￿t from it. The opposite is true
if agents can insure against consumption risk with other assets. This is a nice
further step towards understanding the role of monetary policy not just in the
U.S. but in other countries.
5 History
Several papers look at money and ￿nancial institutions from the historical per-
spective. In ￿How Amsterdam Got Fiat Money,￿Stephen Quinn and William
Roberds investigate the system introduced by the Bank of Amsterdam in 1683.
Using data from the Amsterdam Municipal Archives, they partially reconstruct
changes in the bank￿ s balance sheet from 1666 through 1702. Their calculations
show that the Bank of Amsterdam, which was founded in 1609, engaged in two
archetypal central bank activities￿ lending and open market operations￿ both
before and after its adoption of a ￿at standard. These activities were made
possible by the bank￿ s (near) monopoly on large-value payments within the
city of Amsterdam. After 1683, however, the bank was able to conduct more
aggressive policy interventions. To ease seasonal credit pressures, the bank rou-
tinely extended large loans to the East India Company, and it also bought and
sold signi￿cant quantities of precious metal in order to stabilize the value of its
money. The bank￿ s successful management of a ￿at standard foreshadows later
developments in the history of central banking.
Prior to the U.S. Civil War, several states established bank liability insurance
schemes of two basic types. One was an insurance fund, in which member
banks paid into a state-run fund that would pay losses of bank creditors. The
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responsible the liabilities of any bank that became insolvent. In ￿Bank Liability
Insurance Schemes Prior to 1865,￿Warren Weber argues that both schemes did
well at insuring bank creditors, but neither prevented bank panics. In fact, bank
failure rates were somewhat higher for banks that were part of these schemes.
The experience with these schemes shows that regulatory incentives matter for
controlling moral hazard, obviously an important message for contemporary
economies as well. The schemes that provided the most control of moral hazard
were those that had a high degree of mutuality of losses borne by all banks
participating in the scheme.
In ￿Mechanism Design and Commodity Money,￿Richard Dutu and Ching-
jen Sun propose a model where pro￿t-maximizing mints design menus of coins
for buyers. Buyers purchase coins from mints and use them to buy goods from
sellers. Coins di⁄er in two dimensions: by their weight (or ￿neness), which
re￿ ects an intrinsic quality, and by their seigniorage fee (the mint￿ s revenue).
Two di⁄erent market structures are examined: In one, the supply of coins is
controlled by a monopoly, while in the other it is determined by in competitive
market. The model o⁄ers answers to several puzzles associated with commodity
money systems, such as the lack of small change, the unappealing denomination
structure and variations in seigniorage rates across coins. For example, when the
mint has a monopoly over the supply of coins, they show that the menu of coins
o⁄ered to buyers is characterized by ine¢ ciently small low-denomination coins
and by seigniorage rates that are higher on small coins. When the proportion of
low-valuation buyers is too small, it is optimal for the mint to o⁄er large coins
only, hence, the lack of small change. Like the rest of these papers on historical
issues, this one is useful for thinking about modern economies as well.
6 Information
The next group of papers concern informational frictions. This is potentially a
very important area of research on asset markets, where it can be di¢ cult for
traders to know the quality of some securities. Especially since the recent ￿nan-
cial crisis, it seems necessary to understand how asset markets function with
adverse selection. Veronica Guerierri, Robert Shimer and Randall Wright, in
￿Equilibrium in Dynamic Asset Markets￿assume buyers may be less informed
about the return on an asset. This may a⁄ect the price of assets, and moreover,
informational frictions imply that it may take a longer time to trade, which
means liquidity is a⁄ected. A big issue that comes up in modeling asset mar-
kets with private information is this: what mechanism determines the terms of
trade? The authors use price posting with directed search, also known as com-
petitive search equilibrium. They ￿rst extend their earlier work on competitive
search equilibrium with adverse selection from static to dynamic environments.
They then use the model to analyze equilibria in asset markets with private
information. A key insight is that higher quality assets must trade with a lower
probability, or must be less liquid, because this is the way to e⁄ectively screen
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A related paper is ￿Trading Dynamics in Decentralized Markets with Ad-
verse Selection,￿ by Braz Camargo and Benjamin Lester. They also study a
dynamic, decentralized market with asymmetric information and interdepen-
dent values between buyers and sellers. In the model, buyers and sellers are
randomly matched each period, and sellers have private information about the
quality of their goods. If trade occurs, then the pair exits the market; other-
wise, they remain in the market and are randomly matched with new trading
partners in the following period. Since the composition of goods remaining in
the market at each point in time is endogenous, a key component of an indi-
vidual￿ s strategy is whether to trade now or to wait for conditions to improve.
The model delivers a stark relationship between the severity of the informa-
tion frictions and market liquidity, measured by the expected amount of time it
takes to a sell high-quality goods. This framework can be used to understand
how asymmetric information has contributed to the recent ￿nancial crisis, to
describe how such markets might clear over time on their own, and to study the
e⁄ects of government intervention.
Anonymity plays an important role in making money essential. But anonymity
can also constrain choices available to the monetary authority, an aspect of
monetary policy implementation that has not been fully examined in the lit-
erature. In ￿Costly Recordkeeping, Settlement System and Monetary Policy,￿
Pere Gomis-Porqueras and Daniel Sanchez study the implications of anonymity
for optimal policy. They assume that the government lacks the technology to
verify agents￿identities and their private trades. As a result, it must rely on the
public information that is voluntarily created, at a cost, by the private sector in
order to implement monetary policy. If not all private transactions are publicly
reported, then the injections of ￿at money will be asymmetric. In this case,
the socially e¢ cient allocation cannot be implemented by any incentive-feasible
policy. The optimal monetary policy for an economy with a low recordkeeping
cost and a large number of public transactions has positive in￿ ation and nominal
interest rates. Like the other papers in this section, this one helps us understand
better some important aspects of policy making in an uncertain world.
Similarly, in ￿Money and Credit: The Role of the Informal Sector,￿ Pere
Gomis-Porqueras, Adrian Peralta-Alva, and Chris Waller use a search model of
monetary exchange to study sellers￿decision to either be paid in cash or use
credit. Since credit trades are recorded, the government can levy taxes. Cash
avoids any record of the transaction and, hence, taxation. A seller￿ s choice is
really one of being anonymous or not. In the absence of distortionary taxes,
only a credit equilibrium exists, since money is costly to hold. If taxes are
distortionary, then a monetary equilibrium will exist for su¢ ciently low in￿ ation
rates. Credit will be used only when in￿ ation rates are high. If the preferences
of agents are heterogeneous, then money and credit can coexist, with both being
used in some transactions.
In ￿Information in a Monetary Search Model,￿ Mei Dong and Janet Hua
Jiang study the role of information transparency in a monetary model. There
are two types of buyers in the economy: one type is fully informed about the
10price postings by each seller, and the other type is partially informed, only
knowing the aggregate distribution of price postings. The e⁄ect of informa-
tion transparency can be analyzed in cases. When information transparency is
low, increasing transparency results in higher real price and worsens the terms
of trade for buyers (and for sellers). With medium information transparency,
higher transparency causes real prices to decrease and the terms of trade for
buyers to improve. When the fraction of fully informed buyers is high, increas-
ing transparency does not e⁄ect the economy. Costs associated with holding
money or with ex ante investments have important implications about the ef-
fect of information transparency.
Some recent monetary economics literature studies counterfeiting, but most
the papers do not have counterfeiting occurring in equilibrium. This seems con-
trary to what we observe, where counterfeiting of bank notes in some countries
has recently experienced rapid increases. In ￿Counterfeit Quality and Veri￿ca-
tion in a Monetary Exchange,￿Ben Fung and Enchuan Shao examine conditions
under which counterfeiting can occur and, when it does, how policy including
anti-counterfeiting measures a⁄ects it. The authors use a competitive search
environment, where sellers post o⁄ers and buyers direct their search based on
posted o⁄ers. When sellers are uninformed, their o⁄ers are pooling and, as a
result, buyers are able to extract rents by using counterfeits. Counterfeit notes
can coexist with genuine notes. Since the interaction between sellers￿veri￿cation
decisions and counterfeiters￿choices of counterfeit quality is explicitly modeled,
the authors can study how policies a⁄ect counterfeiting.
7 Theory
There were several papers on pure monetary theory. In ￿A Monetary Theory
with Non-Degenerate Distributions,￿Guido Menzio, Shouyong Shi and Hongfei
Sun construct a tractable directed-search model with a non-degenerate distribu-
tion of money holdings. This is useful since, obviously, in actual economies some
individuals hold more money than others. The rationale underlying a range of
policies designed for reallocating liquidity among individuals depends on the dis-
tribution of money holdings. However, much monetary theory has abstracted
from this non-degenerate distribution for reasons of tractability. Menzio et al. in
their model have a distribution of money holdings that is non-degenerate. This
distribution a⁄ects individuals￿decisions indirectly through a one-dimensional
variable￿ the wage rate. This relationship drastically reduces the state space for
individuals￿decisions, and makes the model relatively tractable. In the equi-
librium, buyers follow a stylized spending pattern over time, and the money
distribution has a persistent wealth e⁄ect.
Going back to the original Kiyotaki-Wright model of commodity money, it
is well known that this framework has a large multiplicity of dynamic equilib-
ria. In ￿Period Length and the Set of Dynamic Equilibria with Commodity
Money,￿Ezra Ober￿eld and Nicolas Trachter analyze the role that the length
of a period plays in determining the extent of this multiplicity. They adapt the
11basic model so that they can vary period length without altering the fundamen-
tals of the economy. The symmetric version of their model is characterized by
multiplicity of equilibrium and complicated dynamics when the period length is
strictly positive. The continuous time limit of their setup, however, has a unique
symmetric equilibrium. They show that as the time period shrinks, the sets of
possible equilibrium payo⁄s, local averages of strategies played, and dynamic
paths of the economy all converge uniformly to those of the unique equilibrium
in the continuous time limit. Hence, when the relevant time period is short, all
equilibrium paths are well approximated by that of the continuous time limit.
In ￿Endogenous Credit Cycles,￿Chao Gu and Randall Wright study the ￿ uc-
tuations in credit markets with limited commitment. Agents are free to renege
on debt obligations, but those who are (probabilitistically) caught are punished
by exclusion from future credit. This gives rise to an endogenous credit limit.
When the credit limit is binding, collateral can help mitigate the commitment
problem, but does not completely solve it. Two mechanisms for the credit are
examined, Nash bargaining and Walrasian pricing. For both mechanisms, the
model can display exotic dynamic equilibria, including deterministic or stochas-
tic cycles, and chaotic dynamics. In some equilibria, credit conditions change
over time, even though fundamentals are deterministic and stationary. Such
changes are self-ful￿lling prophecies. Also in these equilibria, credit limits may
bind in some periods but not others, illustrating how it is possible to gener-
ate credit freezes. It is also argued that pure credit models resemble monetary
models in some interesting ways, especially in the sense that beliefs play an
important role in determining equilibria.
In ￿Money in a Model of Prior Production and Imperfectly Directed Search,￿
Adrian Masters provides an analysis of how in￿ ation a⁄ects behavior and welfare
when goods must be produced prior to the point of sale. This implies that sellers
have to make inventory decisions based on expected market conditions while
their potential customers decide how much cash to bring to the market based
on expected trading opportunities. Customers￿have preference shocks that are
private information, and sellers in equilibrium charge everyone the same price.
If a buyer likes the good, but not su¢ ciently to pay the seller￿ s posted price,
they may not trade even though there are positive gains from trade. Monetary
policy can mitigate this ine¢ ciency: a departure from the Friedman rule can
improve matters. In this case, in￿ ation erodes the value of money, which means
buyers become less picky and prefer to purchase today rather than wait until
tomorrow. This e⁄ect of in￿ ation is reminiscent of the so-called hot potato
e⁄ect. This paper usefully connects several earlier analyses in one framework.
The next theory paper is motivated by empirical studies that suggest the
price elasticity of demand for a given brand is primarily determined by changes
in the number of customers purchasing that product, rather than changes in
the quantity purchased by each customer. In ￿In￿ ation and Price Competi-
tion￿ Boragan Narajabad develops monetary model with directed-search and
endogenous search intensity to explore the implications of monetary policy for
price distributions, output and average productivity. The are two ine¢ ciencies:
less productive producers produce and producer prices exceed marginal cost.
12Although a little in￿ ation can increase output and improve average productiv-
ity, it raises the welfare of the lucky consumers￿ those who are matched with
productive producers￿ while lowers that of unlucky consumers￿ those who are
matched with unproductive producers
A related paper is ￿Optimal Monetary Policy: Distribution E¢ ciency vs.
Production E¢ ciency,￿by Haitao Xiang. The paper studies the trade-o⁄ be-
tween distribution and production e⁄ects of monetary policy when there are
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. In absence of risk-sharing arrangements, mone-
tary policy serves to provide ex post insurance to smooth consumption. When
liquidity shocks are observable, a type-contingent money transfer can redistrib-
ute purchasing power among consumers desirably; when liquidity shocks are
unobservable, an illiquid bond policy helps. Both policies have positive distri-
butional e⁄ects, but the resulting in￿ ation has a negative e⁄ect on production.
The author provides a su¢ cient condition under which social welfare can be
improved by an in￿ ationary monetary policy, i.e., if consumers are su¢ ciently
relative risk averse, the trade-o⁄ between distributional e¢ ciency gains and
production e¢ ciency losses results in net improvement.
In ￿The coordination value of monetary exchange: Experimental evidence,￿
Gabriele Camera and Marco Casari uncover a new behavioral foundation for why
money promotes impersonal exchange. In experiments, subjects can cooperate
by intertemporally exchanging goods with anonymous opponents they meet at
random. Inde￿nite repetition can support multiple equilibria, from full defec-
tion to the e¢ cient outcome. Introducing the possibility to hold and exchange
intrinsically worthless ￿tickets￿that resemble ￿at money can help equilibrium
selection. Monetary exchange facilitates coordination on cooperation and redis-
tributes surplus from defectors to cooperators. These ￿ndings o⁄er new insights
about cooperation in groups of individuals involved in long-term interactions
and contributes to a large literature on repeated games. Experiments such as
these provide some evidence to assess the validity of such theories. In addition,
this study contributes to an experimental literature on money. In contrast to
previous experiments, money here has neither intrinsic nor redemption value.
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